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Abstract
Many practical and action-oriented international roadmaps to improve the quality of aid and its delivery and impact on
development—including the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, and Busan Partnership—emphasize a more active
involvement of domestic institutions and procedures. Despite widespread agreement among both donor and recipient
countries on this issue, we find that aid often tends to bypass national institutional structures. This practice is sometimes
justified on grounds of high levels of political and administrative corruption and weak implementation capacity in recipi-
ent country bureaucracies. We examine how and to what extent multilateral and bilateral development agencies bypass
national and local government institutions while channeling aid and the impact of such practices on aid effectiveness in
Africa. Based on an empirical study of project aid and budget support provided to Malawi by the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, and the German Economic Group, we argue that earmarked funding, specialized procurement arrange-
ments, and the proliferation of ProjectManagement Units are among themechanisms used to circumvent the involvement
of national institutions. We conclude that while such practices may achieve short-term gains by displaying successful and
visible ‘donorship’, the long-term impact is more uncertain. The bypassing of local institutions results in fragmentation of
aid, lack of coordination among aid industry actors, and a general weakening of policy space and domestic capacity to
formulate and implement development policy.
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1. Introduction
Ever since the end of WWII, and the provision of capi-
tal by the United States to Europe, there has been con-
siderable academic and policy interest in whether and
to what extent foreign aid promotes economic develop-
ment. Even among themost ardent supporters of foreign
aid there is a recurring desire to ensure that disbursed
funds are used efficiently and effectively to meet project
and program goals. Thus, we have witnessed in recent
years a growing interest among aid agencies and con-
sultants to monitor and evaluate what is often termed
‘aid effectiveness.’ And several international roadmaps
to improve the quality of aid and its delivery and im-
pact on development—including the Paris Declaration
(OECD, 2005), Accra Agenda for Action (AAA; OECD,
2008), and Busan Partnership (OECD, 2011)—emphasize
a more active involvement of domestic institutions and
procedures. Despite widespread agreement among both
donor and recipient countries on the issue of ‘owner-
ship,’ we argue that a large amount of disbursed aid con-
tinues to bypass national institutional structures. Such
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practices are often justified by donors as necessary due
to high levels of political and administrative corruption
and weak implementation capacity in recipient coun-
try bureaucracies.
While all actors in the aid industry demand that aid
should be effective, they disagree on how it should be
delivered to ensure effectiveness. In this article, we ex-
amine how and to what extent multilateral and bilat-
eral development agencies bypass national and local
government institutions while channeling aid and the
impact of such practices on aid effectiveness in Africa.
Our empirical focus is Malawi, heavily aid-dependent
and recently ranked the third poorest country in the
world. We study project aid and budget support pro-
vided to the country’s Local Development Fund (LDF) by
the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB),
and the German Economic Group (KfW). Designed as an
inter-governmental fiscal transfer mechanism, the LDF
was established by the Government of Malawi in 2009
to mobilize resources for poverty reduction interven-
tions in accordance with the provisions of international
agreements that promoted greater harmonization of aid
and recipient government ownership. The initiative func-
tioned as a basket fund, pooling resources for develop-
ment and governance projects at the local level, with
the Government of Malawi given the power to spend re-
sources at its own discretion but based on the national
policies such as the Malawi Growth and Development
Strategy. The government envisioned that the LDF, as a
pooled fund, would enable better coordination of the nu-
merous projects that donors were implementing at the
local level either on their own or through civil society or-
ganizations. The goal was to stop donors bypassing the
country’s public administration and ensure greater effec-
tiveness of disbursed development aid to local councils
by actively making use of government structures.
We examine the functioning of the LDF in practice
and the extent to which it has promoted harmonized
policies and aid aligned to the needs and goals of the
national government. In particular, we critically analyze
how earmarked funding, specialized procurement ar-
rangements, and the creation of a specialized Project
Management Unit (PMU) have been used by donors to
bypass the involvement, and curtail the power, of na-
tional institutions. Our study is based in fieldwork con-
ducted in Malawi in the period 2015–2018. In addi-
tion to visiting LDF projects in four districts—Lilongwe,
Zomba, Thyolo, and Mangochi—we conducted forty-five
in-depth interviews with local and national government
officials as well as those representing the three donor
agencies—the World Bank, AfDB and KfW German Eco-
nomic Bank. The research districts were purposively
sampled based on their performance and rating regard-
ing LDF projects. The in-depth interviews were semi-
structured to allow detailed probing of themes being ex-
amined. At the local council level, respondents were se-
lected from the directorates of Planning and Develop-
ment, Public Works, and Finance—agencies that are sig-
nificantly involved in LDF projects and hence conversant
with issues that were being examined. We also inter-
viewed traditional authorities (chiefs), local councilors,
and Members of Parliament (MPs). In-depth interviews
were conducted with officials from the Ministry of Local
Government and Rural Development, the Ministry of
Finance, the National Local Government Finance Com-
mittee, and the LDF-Technical Support Team (hereafter
LDF-TST). The informants were identified on the basis of
being key players in the aid industry either as donors or
policymakers in Malawi. They represented a variety of
public institutions and aid agencies, thus allowing us to
achieve triangulation and solicit diverse views. With the
agreement of our informants, all interviews have been
anonymized given the sensitive nature of the topic.
In Section 2, we briefly examine the relationship be-
tween aid and development, with a particular focus on
the evolution and growing popularity of the international
aid effectiveness agenda in recent decades. In Section 3,
we undertake a discussion of aid dependency in Malawi,
setting the scene for our empirical focus. Following this,
we introduce the LDF in Section 4 before analyzing its
functioning and impact in relation to four sets of issues:
earmarked funding and procurement procedures; coordi-
nation and project management; aid and patronage pol-
itics; and institutional design and competition for scarce
resources. We end with some concluding reflections on
the effectiveness of bypass strategies.
2. Foreign Aid for Development
The historical foundations of foreign aid are numerous.
In addition to political ideology, foreign policy, com-
mercial interests, and national security, there are large
elements of altruism and a desire to reduce global
poverty. The world of foreign aid is complex and in-
cludes Official Development Assistance (concessional
flows with a grant element of at least 25%) and devel-
opment, humanitarian, and emergency aid provided by
non-governmental organizations, civil society organiza-
tions, bilateral donors, and multilateral agencies.
Over the past couple of decades, there have been
interesting exchanges on the conceptual foundations
and effectiveness of providing aid. Some, like Calderisi
(2006, p. 163), argue that ‘foreign aid, as a whole,
has not worked,’ particularly in Africa. Such conclusions
strengthen the arguments of scholars like Easterly (2006),
who has famously made the case for ‘searchers,’ i.e.
those who not only find things that work but also accept
responsibility for their actions, in contrast to ‘planners,’
who are supposedly more interested in applying ‘global
blueprints’ than in adapting to local conditions. Jeffrey
Sachs has responded by claiming that by notmaking care-
ful distinctions across countries and types of programs,
such conclusions suffer from a major methodological er-
ror and end up conveying ‘a misplaced sense of helpless-
ness in the face ofmassive but solvable problems’ (Sachs,
2006, p. 1309).
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The arguments in favor of aid typically emphasize the
positive and significant impact that it has on growth—
even though the magnitude of such an effect may be
low (Clemens, Radelet, & Bhavnani, 2004). Some ar-
gue that aid finances crucial public investments required
for infrastructure and physical and human capital, and
improves fiscal discipline (e.g. tax collection and re-
form). Sustained donor–recipient dialogue with flexible
conditionality also increases aid effectiveness (Dalgaard,
Hansen, & Tarp, 2004; Hansen & Tarp, 2001). The empir-
ical literature, however, does not offer a clear theoreti-
cal model on how aid affects economic growth (Easterly,
2003). Indeed, many influential quantitative studies do
not find an independent effect of foreign aid on eco-
nomic growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar,
2002). Thus, those who argue the case against aid typi-
cally point to the large number of African countries that
have experienced little economic growth despite being
major recipients of aid for decades. They highlight sev-
eral explanations for this lack of success: large areas with
poor infrastructure networks and over-dependence on
primary commodity exports; poor governance and weak
political commitment to market reform; and inadequate
resources for financial investment. With such factors in
mind, some conclude that it is not possible to test the ‘ab-
solute effectiveness’ of aid but rather only the ‘marginal
effectiveness’ (Morrissey, 2006).
Other voices, some from Africa (e.g. Moyo, 2009),
claim that trade, and not aid, is crucial for economic
growth. Although aid is often conditioned on recipient
countries respecting democratic rights, donors them-
selves often do not abide by such values. The argument is
that aid often results in a large and ineffective public sec-
tor and is an impediment for private sector development.
Without fiscal and budgetary discipline, large public bu-
reaucracies, funded with aid money, breed corruption
(Ayittey, 2005). Moreover, some studies show that aid to
a repressive regime helps consolidate its power through
corruption and exploitation (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, & Morrow, 2003), while others argue that aid
should only be given to countries already implementing
good policies (Dollar & Levin, 2004).
2.1. The Aid Effectiveness Agenda
Since theMonterrey International Conference on Financ-
ing for Development (in 2002), there been an increased
focus on the type and quality of foreign aid that can
most effectively reduce poverty. The movement for aid
effectiveness received a further boost with the Paris
Declaration (2005),which recommended local ownership
of policies by recipient countries; alignment of devel-
opment programs in accordance with developing coun-
try priorities; harmonization of practices among donors
in order to avoid fragmentation, duplication, and high
transaction costs; creation of a results framework for
measuring impact; and increased mutual accountability
and transparency of aid flows. The commitments made
in Paris were followed by the signing in 2008 of the
AAA, which reiterated the importance of strengthening
three key aspects of aid: ownership, inclusive partner-
ships, and delivery of results (OECD, 2008). The AAA
also served as a forum for reviewing progress in meeting
targets achieved since the Paris Declaration. The direc-
tion and volume of aid flows are historically contingent,
and some studies have highlighted how voting patterns
in the UN, colonial ties, and political and strategic con-
siderations continue to shape global aid flows (Alesina
& Dollar, 2000; Bermeo, 2018; Dietrich, 2013, 2018;
Easterly, 2006; Knack, 2004). The growing role of emerg-
ing donors including India, China and Brazil was also dis-
cussed at AAA, and all actors—donors and recipients—
were encouraged to abide by the Paris principles in pro-
moting coordinated and effective aid. The Paris andAccra
meetings, however, did not result inmajor changes in the
nature, type and predictability of aid flows and some (e.g.
Woods, 2008) argued that aid remained dysfunctional,
fragmented and duplicative. China, in particular, has be-
come very assertive in foreign aid policies, and through
the Forumon China–Africa Cooperation, the Chinese gov-
ernment has increased its support for the activities of Chi-
nese state-owned enterprises and private sector actors
in Africa. It thus interacts in numerous ways with poorer
countries, including through so-called ‘South–South’ dia-
logues, which give access to natural resources and new
and growing markets, and reduce the dependence of
African countries on traditional forms of aid. Rather than
providing budget support to governments, and condition-
ing aid on support for democracy and gender equality,
the Chinese model emphasizes the principles of ‘win–
win,’ ‘mutual respect,’ ‘friendship,’ and ‘non-interference’
(Banik, 2013; Banik & Chasukwa, 2016).
Key debates on aid effectiveness have centred on se-
lectivity and modalities. The major proponents of aid se-
lectivity for increased effectiveness argue that aid should
be given to countries that have good policies because
they will deliver on what aid ought to achieve (Burnside
& Dollar, 1997, 2004). Thus, Burnside and Dollar (2004)
claim that good policies will not only make aid more ef-
fective, but that they will also succeed in facilitating eco-
nomic growth. In practice, donors use such arguments
when providing tied aid aimed at improving the policy
environment of recipient countries. However, aid selec-
tivity remains controversial. For example, Dietrich, 2013,
p. 208) notes how donors continue to give aid to coun-
tries with not so good policies:
In 2008, Haiti, a developing country with an abysmal
record of governance, receivedmore than 700million
US dollars in bilateral development assistance from
OECD donor countries, amounting to roughly 70 dol-
lars of aid per capita. In the same year, Tanzania,
whose institutions of intermediate strength bodewell
for eﬀective aid implementation, received around
2 billion US dollars in bilateral assistance, equivalent
to approximately 47 dollars in per capita aid.
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Despite the controversy surrounding aid selectivity,
donors continue to implement reforms aimed at reduc-
ing fragmentation of aid and improving the policy envi-
ronment in recipient countries. Oh and Kim (2015, p. 92)
argue that aid proliferation occurs when donor budgets
increase, which in turn gives rise to fragmented aid. Thus,
the proliferation of aid can harm economic growth in re-
cipient countries. Moreover, such proliferation is an ob-
stacle to effective aid as interventions are uncoordinated
and primarily tend to address the interests of donors
and not those of recipient countries. When donors split
their aid, the result is often an increase inmechanisms by
which they can choose to bypass local government struc-
tures citing institutional and human capacity inadequa-
cies and corruption (Dietrich & Winters, 2016; Quibria,
2014). A typical bypass involves ‘donors channeling aid
through intergovernmental or nongovernmental organi-
zations (IGOs and NGOs) and providing in-kind aid like
food and medicine directly to citizens in recipient coun-
tries’ (Dietrich, 2013, p. 208). In this age of competitive
bilateralism and multilateralism, donors also engage the
private sector in circumventing local government struc-
tures. In a typical bypass, donors are in control of the aid,
and retain control over most decisions on how aid is al-
located and spent. Such bypass mechanisms give donors
the discretion to make decisions that have direct or indi-
rect impact on government policies.
The fast-changing international aid landscape and
the growing role of civil society and private organizations
as well as emerging countries as providers of aid was the
focus of the Busan Partnership for EffectiveDevelopment
Cooperation (OECD, 2011). A major outcome was agree-
ment on a two-tier approach (voluntary for emerging
donors) that committed signatories to continued com-
mitment to development and greater accountability of
their own actions and inactions (Burnell, 1997; Leiderer,
2013; Oya, 2006; Dreher et al., 2014). The modalities for
achieving such results, however, remain unclear. Some
studies have identified structural bottlenecks in the im-
plementation of the Paris principles, including the ab-
sence of donor accountability and credible penalties for
non-compliance (Rogerson, 2005) and the dominance of
a ‘planning’ mind-set that downplays the role of actors
with diverse and competing interests (Barder, 2009). Oth-
ers have argued that the principles of ‘harmonization’
and ‘ownership’ are incompatible (Hyden, 2008).
Wolfensohn (1999, p. 9) describes partnership in de-
velopment aid as a relationship ‘led by governments and
parliaments of the countries, influenced by the civil soci-
ety of those countries, and joined by the domestic and
international private sectors, and by bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors.’ A common feature of the declarations
in Paris, Accra, and Busan is the importance of treating
donors and recipients as equals. These declarations thus
re-vitalized previous international discussions that em-
phasized partnership, including the 1969 Pearson Com-
mission report on development partners and the 1980
Brandt Commission report, ‘North–South: A Program for
Survival’ (Maxwell & Riddell, as cited in Crawford, 2003,
p. 140). Since the Paris Declaration, the aid community
has attached growing importance to budget support, par-
ticularly in Africa. For example, 20% of donor flows in
Mozambique in the year the Paris Declaration was signed
was budget support (Renzio & Hanlon, 2009, p. 258),
while in Tanzania around 40% of aid in 2009 was chan-
neled through the national budget as compared to 30% in
2002 (Harrison, Mulley, & Holtom, 2009, p. 281). Budget
support comes in different forms and includes so-called
‘pooled development funds’—which are ‘arrangements
where donors provide financial contributions towards a
common set of broadobjectives andwhere allocations for
specific activities are decided by a joint governing mech-
anism’ (Ball & Beijnum, 2010, p. 3). Others highlight that
pooled funds are ‘a financing arrangement where donors
pool their resources using a special account…managed by
one of the participating donors or by the respective line
ministries’ (Bandstein, 2007, p. 3). Thus, a key issue ap-
pears to be close collaboration, with the recipient country
taking the lead in determining the policies that are to be
supported and deciding the policy instruments and inter-
ventions to be used in pursuing policy objectives. In other
words, donors agree to contribute resources to pooled
funds to support the policies that have been determined
by the national governments of aid-receiving countries.
By supporting such national policies and priorities, donor
agencies aim to fulfil their pledge to promote harmoniza-
tion, mutual accountability, results management, and re-
spect for country-owned policies and structures, as es-
poused in the 2005 Paris Declaration.
While donors, development agencies and aid-
recipient countries may agree on enhancing overall ef-
fectiveness of development aid, operationalizing such
agreements in practice has always been a challenge. Par-
ties to aid agreements and policies have frequently rene-
gaded on their promises and responsibilities in pursuit
of individual goals. Thus, despite promises made in Paris,
Accra and Busan on the importance of strengthening
global partnerships for increased harmonization of aid,
bypass mechanisms—as exemplified by the prolifera-
tion of PMUs—have continued to flourish (Abdel-Malek,
2015; Li, 2017). The reluctance to phase out PMUs is per-
haps also a reflection of the new donor landscape, with
the entrance of emerging countries and philanthropic
organizations. And current assessments of the quality of
aid pays little or no attention to the existence of PMUs.
The emphasis on ‘value formoney’ and ‘quantification of
results/outputs’ by most major donors has contributed
to the increased usage of bypass arrangements and re-
version to projectmodality in aid delivery as donors show
increased interest in balancing score sheets and ticking
the right boxes (Yanguas, 2018). Indeed, Bermeo (2018)
argue that although ‘targeted development’ is meant
to reach out to specific vulnerable groups, the contin-
ued use of project aid and PMUs show that such efforts
fall into the same trap that of the ‘results agenda’. The
aid industry appears to have been reduced to chasing
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matrices, since mobilization of resources by donors and
development agencies is dependent on the available
proof to have successfully completed ‘value for money’
interventions that can document high impact on benefi-
ciaries. With both donors and recipients under pressure
to identify and report projects that can document ‘value
for money’, the current global partnership framework
has the potential of compromising aid effectiveness.
3. Malawi: Development in a Highly Aid-Dependent
Context
With growing climate-related threats to agricultural pro-
duction, millions of Malawians regularly go to bed hun-
gry every night. Moreover, the country does not per-
form well in international rankings such as those on hu-
man development and perceptions of corruption. For
example, with a Human Development Index value of
0.477 in 2017 (below the average of 0.504 for countries
in the Low Human Development group and below the
average of 0.537 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa),
Malawi is ranked 171 out of 189 countries in a newly
released UNDP statistical update. Indeed, many West-
ern analysts have even begun to propagate the idea that
Malawi is unique—‘There are developing countries, and
then there is Malawi’—implying that a sense of hope-
lessness characterizes the country’s development trajec-
tory (Banik, 2018). All of this points to a paradox: de-
spite peace, political stability, and consistent support for
democracy, a largemajority of the country’s rapidly grow-
ing population (estimated to be over 18 million) has not
witnessed radical improvement in their living standards
(Banik, 2018).
Malawi is particularly interesting as it is heavily de-
pendent on bilateral and multilateral donors to meet
the cost of implementing its national budget. This has
made the country highly vulnerable to external influ-
ence on matters of economic development. Indeed, the
proxy influence of donors on development policies can
be gauged from the extent of budgetary support they
provide. A focus on Malawi to study the aid effective-
ness agenda is also interesting as the country has im-
plemented several bold policies—on occasion against
the wishes of influential foreign aid donors—that have
worked for short periods in promoting food security, but
have subsequently been overshadowed by political pa-
tronage, corruption, and leakages.
According to Van derMeer, Tostensen, Slob and Jerve
(2008, p. 17), foreign aid as a proportion of the govern-
ment budget averaged 38% over the period 1994–2006,
the bulk of which was grants (averaging 72% of all for-
eign aid). The situation today is not much different, with
donor funds accounting for 38% of the total budget in
the 2013–14 fiscal year (Van der Meer et al., 2008). Be-
tween 2004 and 2010, Malawi consistently received less
in loans than in grants. For instance, DAC statistics indi-
cate that the country received 7% of total Official Devel-
opment Assistance (ODA) as loans and 93% as grants in
2010 (Amundsen, 2017). The trend of grants dominating
the aid flows continued between 2012 and 2015 with
83% of assistance provided as grants in 2012–13, 77%
in 2013–14, and 80% in the 2014–15 (Malawi Govern-
ment, 2015b). Although grants have continues to dom-
inate, loans have increased slightly over the years, with
the World Bank providing the majority of loans. The per-
centage of assistance provided as loans increased from
14% in 2012–13 to 19% in 2013–14, and then decreased
slightly (still a net increase from 2012–13 to 2014–15) to
17% in 2014–15. In 2014–15, the World Bank provided
61% of all assistance delivered through loans. Among
bilateral donors, the United States of America and the
United Kingdomare the largest funding partners (Malawi
Government, 2015b).
Malawi’s external debt stock was US$1,783 million
as of December 2015, with multilaterals accounting for
US$1,323 million, while the debt portfolios for bilat-
eral and commercial creditors were US$428.8 million
and US$114.5 million, respectively. The International
Development Association of the World Bank, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and the AfDB are the ma-
jor multilateral creditors, accounting for 47%, 20%, and
18%, respectively.
Since 2013, the World Bank has been the largest
source of financing to Malawi, providing about 45%
of all loan disbursements (Malawi Government, 2015a).
It is anticipated that the organization will continue to
play a major role, as its current Country Assistance
Strategy shows that US$300 million has been committed
to Malawi for a five-year period (Malawi Government,
2015a). The AfDB has been the second largest source of
foreign loans, with 13% of all loan disbursements made
since 2013 (Malawi Government, 2017). According to
the AfDB’s Country Strategy Paper, the planned disburse-
ments amount to US$820 million over a five-year period,
of which US$266 million is on non-concessional terms.
China and India are the major bilateral creditors,
with 54% and 35% of debts, respectively. China is a
relatively new development partner, which has been
offering semi/non-concessional loans since 2008. Cur-
rently, China represents 15% of disbursements on all
loans made since 2012. India, which is another relatively
new development partner, has accounted for 15% of
all loan disbursements received by the Government of
Malawi since 2012. Other non-Paris bilateral lenders, in-
cluding Kuwait Fund, Saudi Fund and the United Arab
Emirates, are expected to provide US$205 million over
five years starting in 2016. Poland, a new non-traditional
donor, has indicated willingness to support Malawi’s de-
velopment agenda on a non-concessional basis (Malawi
Government, 2017).
In theory, all development aid, including bilateral and
multilateral assistance, is governed by the Malawi Devel-
opment Cooperation Strategy launched in 2014.1 In prac-
tice, however, external actors hold the upper hand. The
1 The current Malawi Development Cooperation Strategy succeeds the previous Development Assistance Strategy (2006–2011).
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relationship between successive Malawian governments
and donors has been largely cordial, although there have
been several disagreements and confrontations. All five
regimes2 that have governed the country since 1994
have experienced either withdrawal or suspension of
aid. For example, aid was withdrawn during the reign
of Hastings Kamuzu Banda on account of bad gover-
nance and violation of human rights (Meinhardt & Patel,
2003; Resnick, 2012). Similar reasonswere citedwhen aid
was withdrawn during subsequent administrations (Von
Hagen & Schulz, 2009; Wroe, 2012). Budget support has
been suspended on numerous occasions, including 2002,
2003, 2011, and 2012–13 (Amundsen, 2017). The puni-
tive actions on the aid front have often resulted in suc-
cessive Malawian governments accusing donors of neo-
colonization and meddling in domestic politics with the
aimof initiating regime change. Following amajor corrup-
tion scandal in 2013—dubbed ‘Cashgate’—major donors
including the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Euro-
pean Union suspended their budget support, although
they continued to deliver aid through projects, programs,
and pooled funds. This decision by donors, which con-
tinues today, has raised questions on the preferred aid
modalities of traditional aid-givers and the future scenar-
ios under which aid will be provided to Malawi.
4. The Local Development Fund
Aid is channeled to developing countries through ei-
ther on-budget or off-budget categories. On-budget aid
modalities are generally preferred by recipient coun-
tries as they, not donors, control the resources and de-
cide how these should be allocated. In many situations,
donors prefer to deliver aid through off-budget modali-
ties, where they retain greater control of the agenda and
can more directly try to design and implement interven-
tions in recipient countries that are key to their interests.
Motivated by the need to promote increased harmo-
nization of aid and closer alignment with national devel-
opment priorities3 following major international decla-
rations and agreements in Paris, Accra, and Busan, the
Malawian government established the LDF in 2009 as
an inter-governmental fiscal transfer mechanism aimed
at mobilizing finance for poverty reduction. The LDF—
which evolved from the Malawi Social Action Fund
(MASAF) and was established in 1995 with seed funds
from the World Bank and the Government of Malawi—
is designed to function as a discretionary public financ-
ing grant facility that can quickly disburse funds for de-
velopment projects to local governments. The LDF was
established as a basket fund where the government and
all donors could pool their resources for development
and governance projects at the local level. The pooled
funds were aimed at improving aid governance by en-
suring that there were only a few players in the local de-
velopment sector, who could easily coordinate and work
with each other. The government was given themandate
to spend LDF funds at its discretion, as long as these de-
cisions were based on national policies and priorities.
The LDF pools and disburses funds through four fund-
ing windows—community, urban, local authority, and
performance. Donors (or ‘development partners’)mainly
contribute with financial aid and technical support. The
combined contributions of the World Bank, KfW, and
AfDB for the period 2009–2014 was approx. US$126 mil-
lion,which constituted 62%of the total funds received by
the LDF in this period. The World Bank, with US$107.8
million, was the major financier, followed by the AfDB
(USD 17 million) and KfW (US$1.8 million) (LDF-TST,
2015a). In accordance with the agreement signed with
donors, the Government of Malawi provided the remain-
ing funds in cash and kind (e.g. providing office space and
paying salaries of selected staff). The government’s cash
contribution was highly unstable, and payments were
often less than the agreed amounts. During fieldwork,
the significant role of donors in funding the LDF was
acknowledged by a government official, who remarked,
‘LDF is much about donors when it comes to making the
finances available to roll out the activities.’4 The key point
is that LDF is heavily donor dependent. This heavy re-
liance on donors has weakened the ability of the govern-
ment to improve aid coordination. As of June 2014, the
LDF funding portfolio was at US$245 million, including
commitments by donors and the government of Malawi
for projects until 2019 (LDF-TST, 2015a, p. 3).
4.1. Earmarked Funding and Procurement Procedures
The LDF itself entails an administrative bypass, as funds
are centrally managed by the LDF-TST instead of the
National Local Government Finance Committee—the
constitutional body mandated to manage all develop-
ment funds that target local councils. Staff at LDF-TST
sign contracts with the Ministry of Finance giving the
impression that they are part of the civil service and
using government salary scale. However, LDF-TST em-
ployees have different conditions of service from those
of civil servants and their salaries are above those of
Malawian civil servants. Since its operational costs are
covered by the World Bank, the LDF-TST is often re-
ferred to as a ‘super-NGO that implements activities of
donors other than those of the central government and
local councils.’5 Contrary to the rules of the LDF pooled
funding, donors earmark their resources. For example,
the funding windows are attached to specific donors,
which has allowed these actors to profile themselves
as promoting specific developmental agendas. Thus, the
World Bank funds three windows (local authority, perfor-
2 Hastings Kamuzu Banda (July 1964–May 1994), Bakili Muluzi (May 1994–May 2004), Bingu wa Mutharika (May 2004–April 2012), Joyce Banda (April
2012–May 2014), and Peter wa Mutharika (2014–present).
3 These include the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS II), the Decentralization Policy and the Local Government Act.
4 Key informant interview, Ministry of Finance, Lilongwe, 4 December 2015.
5 Key informant interview, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Lilongwe, 8 December 2015.
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mance, and community), which are used to implement
public works programs and community demand-driven
projects, mainly related to the construction of school
blocks and teachers’ houses.
A senior official of the LDF-TST observed:
When we receive funding from the World Bank, we
actually know what it is supposed to be spent on. Any
expenditure outside the identified project is queried.
The next thing are threats on suspension and with-
draw of funding as well as penalties.’6
It is important to note that these are the very same activi-
ties that the Bank previously funded (1995–2007) during
the final three stages of the MASAF. The KfW and AfDB
fund and identify closely with the urban window. And
KfW funds are earmarked for two activities: ‘construction
of socio-economic infrastructure (bus stations, stadia,
markets, administrative buildings) and urban planning’
(LDF-TST, 2015b, p. 15). Just as theWorld Bank’s record of
funding activities reflects its previous LDF priorities, the
KfW had previously funded and prioritized construction
activities (through the Secondary Centers Development
Program) for over two decades in the period 1985–2007.
In the LDF, KfW activities are aimed at boosting the lo-
cal revenue base of urban councils. For this purpose, it
has provided earmarked funds for the construction of
markets, bus stations, and halls (LDF-TST, 2015a). Even
in the LDFwhere councils ‘identify’ their projects and the
KfW provide funds, the projects are similar to those that
the KfW funded under Secondary Centers Development
Program (LDF-TST, 2015b). And just like the World Bank
and KfW, the AfDB continues to fund LDF activities in lo-
cal economic development that are very similar to the
Poverty Alleviation Program it funded in 1994.
Given such trends, a local government official
claimed that the:
LDF has been an earmarked fund from the start. The
‘pooling’ of funds is to the convenience of donors be-
cause they want to be seen to be using government
structures although that is only on paper and not
in practice. Government does not determine which
projects are to be implemented.7
Such earmarked funding in the LDF was justified by
donors as a necessary strategy to ensure that aid is allo-
cated to strategic interventions. As an official of the AfDB
noted:
We do our assessments that tell us which projects and
activities to fund. Above all, we also do have our own
areas of interest indicated in our Country Develop-
ment Assistance Plan thatwe have to stick to. Earmark-
ing is in the best interest of donors and stakeholders
we serve—government and community members.8
While the government provides, in principle, matching
funds to all LDF windows, donors have continued to
fund their pet projects but give the impression of align-
ing their interests with the financing arrangements and
priorities of the government. Indeed, the impression
given is that previously prioritized funding mechanisms
are now ‘surrendered’ to the LDF for the sake of im-
proved effectiveness and in the name of good ‘donor-
ship.’ One of the implications of this arrangement is that
each funding agency (donor) requires the LDF-TST to
follow their own specific procedures which means the
Malawi Procurement Act is not applied when procur-
ing goods and services with funds from donors. An ex-
ample is the advert on a technical audit for benefi-
ciary verification of the World Bank-funded social cash
transfer program in Malawi. In the advert, it was high-
lighted that ‘the selection Procedures shall be in accor-
dance with the World Bank Procedures’ (LDF-TST, 2018,
p. 2). Similarly, the shortlisting and selection of audit
services for the AfDB-funded projects were based on
the ‘the selection procedure…in accordance with the
AfDB’s Procurement Policy Framework’ (LDF-TST, 2015b,
p. 2). Such diversity in procurement procedures creates
numerous challenges—including increased costs, delays
in decision-making, an overwhelmed and overburdened
administrative staff, and delays in project completion—
which in turn impact the effectiveness of aid.
Managing aid is not easy and there are numerous
challenges on the ground. A respondent from the LDF-TST
noted: ‘We work under pressure and get confused. We
have several forms to complete and reports for individual
donors to write. We are told they need to have their im-
pact isolated from other donors.’9 Indeed, the dominant
narrative was that the LDF-TST and local council officials
spend a considerable amount of their time on paperwork.
4.2. Coordination and Project Management
Realizing that the country in 2009 had over 48 PMUs
that involved 12 donors and functioned parallel to na-
tional institutions and policies, the government banned
the creation of new PMUs (Nilsson & Nkhoma, 2014).
Many of the existing PMUs were in the health sector. De-
spite the presence of a relatively well-organized Sector-
Wide Approach (SWAp), around 100 projects from more
than 20 donors provided funding to the health sector
outside of the SWAp arrangement (OECD, 2012).10 The
6 Key informant interview, LDF-TST, Lilongwe, 7 January 2016.
7 Key informant interview, local government official, Directorate of Planning and Development, Mangochi, 19 January 2016.
8 Key informant interview, AfDB, Lilongwe, 22 March 2016.
9 Key informant interview, LDF-TST, Lilongwe, 25 March 2016.
10 SWAp refers to mechanisms ‘by which Governments and donors can support the development of a sector in an integrated fashion through a single sec-
tor policy and expenditure programme, under Government leadership, using commonmanagement and reporting procedures and progressing towards
the use of Government procedures to disburse and account for all funds’ (Foster & Fozzard, 2000, p. 55).
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government indicated that its intention was to phase
out 27 PMUs by 2011 (OECD, 2012). However, by 2015,
Malawi still had 33 PMUs—six more than the 27 paral-
lel PMUs that the Government was aiming to have by
2011. Moreover, parallel PMUs were still being estab-
lished upon the insistence of donors, who made the es-
tablishment of parallel PMUs a condition for providing
aid. Thus, of the 33 parallel PMUs that existed in 2015, six
were affiliated to donors participating in the LDF—World
Bank (5) and AfDB (1).
In our interactions with the World Bank and KfW, we
were often told that the LDF is a pooled fundmanaged by
the Government of Malawi. However, government offi-
cials claimed that the LDF ismanaged by a parallel PMU—
termed the LDF-TST. As an official in theMinistry of Local
Government put it:
The LDF-TST operates outside government machin-
ery…[O]n paper they appear to be part of govern-
ment but in practice they are not—they do their own
project planning, handle finances and hold discus-
sions with donors on their own.’11
Indeed, having investigated the organizational set-up of
the LDF, we find considerable evidence that the LDF-
TST is a parallel bypass rather than an embedded PMU.
For an entity to qualify as an embedded PMU, it must
meet three of the following four criteria: (a) the terms
of reference for externally appointed staff are deter-
mined by the country implementation agency, not by
the donor; (b) the most senior staff member is to be ap-
pointed by the country implementation agency, not by
the donor; (c) the salary structure of national staff (in-
cluding beneﬁts) must not be higher than that of civil ser-
vice personnel; and (d) the entitymust be accountable to
the country’s implementing agencies, and not to exter-
nal funding agencies (Ministry of Finance, cited in Said,
McGrath, Grant, & Chapman, 2011, pp. 27–28). We find
that the LDF does not meet three of the criteria above.
In fact, the LDF only meets one criterion—the most pro-
fessional staff member is to be appointed by the country
implementation agency, and not by the donor. Even this
criterion has to be qualified because donors have a say
in the recruitment of professionals as they vet all applica-
tions. A senior AfDB official, however, disagreedwith this
view: ‘We have always believed that the LDF-TST is gov-
ernment institution because employees have their job
contracts with government.’12
What then is the problem with PMUs such as those
in the LDF? Many argue that PMUs are actively used
to bypass government structures by virtue of the enor-
mous amount of funds committed to project support (un-
der donor control) as opposed to general budget sup-
port and sector support, which constitute pooled funds
under the control of the government. For example, in
2011, 67% of all foreign aid resources in Malawi were
allocated to project support and a mere 10% to budget
support and 23% to sector support (Malawi Government,
2015b). Thus, a large chunk of aid is disbursed through
channels that are not preferred by the government. The
major concern is that such active bypass of public insti-
tutions neither contributes to capacity building of weak
institutions nor improves the already fragile legitimacy
of political and administrative structures. The circumven-
tion denies public institutions the opportunity to acquire
experience by working with the best practices and poli-
cies that donors would like them to follow in order to
deliver effective aid. The result appears to be ‘amplifica-
tion effects’ (Ndulo, 2014) in that institutions that were
weak remain weak while those that were strong become
stronger. For example, the LDF has fortified institutions
like the LDF-TST that are outside the public machinery
as donors have equipped such entities with the best and
latest technology, in addition to adequate funding for
attracting and retaining well-qualified staff, who in turn
have been effective in lobbying influential actors both in
the donor community and in government. A respondent
from the Ministry of Local Government indicated, ‘We
see a trend of variation regarding councils responding
to interventions. Performing councils are improving their
operations. The struggling councils are still struggling.’13
The assertion by Booth (2011) that capacity will not
be built in developing countries if donors continue to
avoid working with existing institutions, is applicable in
the context of the LDF. Instead of avoiding institutions,
weak as they may be, the ‘thinking and working polit-
ically’ (TWP) literature on the integration of politics in
development theory and practice (Dasandi, Marquette,
& Robinson, 2016) calls for donors to work with local in-
stitutions in order to understand the factors blocking ef-
fective delivery of aid and to jointly devise solutions to
problems. TWP emphasizes the point made by critics of
bypass structures that aid modalities will have to change
from ‘best practice’ to ‘best fit’ to align with donors’ in-
terests and programs of the recipient country. TWP also
insists that both donors and aid recipients are active po-
litical players in the aid industry and as such the ‘best fit’
modalities need to be informed by the politics of institu-
tional design between the givers and recipients of aid.
4.3. Aid and Patronage Politics
One of the main reasons donors bypass the government
machinery is to avoid political and administrative mis-
management and resulting delays, as well as misalloca-
tion of aid. The LDF is a major financing mechanism for
local development and decentralization projects at the
local council level in Malawi. The power enjoyed by the
PMU (LDF-TST) rests mainly on its ability to prevent aid
being used for unintended purposes. The country’s po-
11 Key informant interview, Rural Development Officer, the Ministry of Local Government, Lilongwe, 19 April 2016.
12 Key informant interview, Senior Technical Officer, AfDB, Lilongwe, 12 April 2016.
13 Key informant interview, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Lilongwe, 27 March 2016.
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litical elites have historically shown considerable inter-
est in using aid for personal economic gain as well as
political survival. Given the massive funds that go into
the LDF, successive ruling parties have tried to ensure
that their chosen candidates are appointed to the most
senior positions. This helps to make policies and strate-
gies more palatable to the government, especially in re-
lation to the distribution of LDF resources. Political ap-
pointees ensure that their political patrons can continue
to access resources that would otherwise be difficult to
gain control over. These officials tend to support projects
championed by political parties. As an LDF official noted,
‘those appointed based on political colors are willing to
help the political party to get resources with or without
technical justification.’14 An example was the executive
director of the LDF (2009–2010) who ensured that two
successiveministers of local government were able to es-
tablish so-called Rural Growth Centers in their home dis-
tricts despite those not originally meeting the selection
criteria.15 An official in theMinistry of Local Government
claimed that the incumbent minister had ‘influenced al-
location of funds to a stadium under the urban window
to his constituency when it did not qualify using the
set criteria.’16
Anotherway for politicians to promote their personal
interests is to encourage temporary (‘acting’) appoint-
ments at the LDF. Such interim officers offer less resis-
tance than permanent staff and are more likely to redi-
rect resources according to the preferences of influential
political leaders. The local communities also highlighted
the role of Members of Parliament in diverting resources
for projects that were not earmarked: ‘TheMP interferes
a lot with our work in the Village Development Commit-
tee. When the MPs fails to get a project at the district
council, he/she approaches us with directives’17 Thus,
we find considerable evidence of political pressure on
the LDF-TST to allocate projects in the constituencies of
political elites, including serving Cabinet ministers. And
a popular view among officials in the ministries of local
government and financewas that eachminister was able
to influence projects in their respective constituencies
that would not have been possible if proper procedures
were followed.
The LDF experience demonstrates that even when
there is an attempt to ring-fence and protect aid, recipi-
ent country politicians continue to find ways of access-
ing and influencing the distribution of such resources.
Both public officials and donors routinely break resource
allocation procedures when faced with pressure from
elected representatives in order not to be seen as sab-
otaging a country’s political agenda and demonstrating
loyalty to the wishes of the electorate. In diverting aid to
personal projects and rewarding individuals and groups
for political support and loyalty, both formal and infor-
mal rules of the game are applied. Informal procedures
are particularly popular when the interests of donors
differ from those of elected representatives, MPs and
council members. The case of diverting Rural Growth
Centers to districts that are politically important is an ex-
ample. The Malawian government borrowed US$14 mil-
lion and US$3.04 million from the AfDB and the World
Bank, respectively, to fund the construction of these cen-
ters (AfDB, 2008). When the criteria to allocate such cen-
ters to particular districts were manipulated by politi-
cal leaders, the AfDB did not raise any concern, possi-
bly for fear of jeopardizing the credit agreement with the
Malawian Government relating to the loan.
TheMalawian case is not unique in this regard. Using
regional data on aid projects financed by theWorld Bank
and theAfDB,Ohler andNunnenkamp (2014) analyze the
motives governing these two multilateral donors’ aid al-
location in 27 African countries. They do not find any
evidence supporting the donors’ claim that more aid
was given to the neediest regions, defined on the ba-
sis of infant mortality, maternal health, and undernutri-
tion. Rather, regions in which political leaders were born
were likely to receive more multilateral aid, in particu-
lar for physical infrastructure projects, which reinforces
the belief that political favoritism plays an important role
in aid allocations (Nunnenkamp, Ohler, & Andres, 2017).
Thus, aid deepens patronage politics as political elites
find ways of using aid for their political purposes.
Donors can hence play Ostrich politics in that they
may deliberately ignore local malpractices, turning a
blind eye to the messy realities of development projects
as long as their own interests are served (Reltien, 2001).
Our reviewof the LDF experience inMalawi suggests that
there is a possibility of donors becoming clients. This is
particularly the case when a donor or a group of donors
face competition from others for the attention of recipi-
ent country policymakers. The growing influence of new
development actors such as China is putting pressure
on more established actors to compromise their stan-
dards in order to stay relevant. Such an understanding
departs from the mainstream literature, particularly on
public sector reforms, which indicates that it is only re-
cipient countries that practice clientelism and patronage.
While Hyden (2008) suggests that donors are complicit
in promoting patronage in aid-receiving countries, we ar-
gue that donors can be patrons or clients—or what Yan-
guas (2014) calls ‘spoilers’—depending on the context.
Development agencies are under pressure to perform
to the satisfaction of their constituents and the head of-
fice. The head office is in turn interested in seeing the
14 Interview, LDF-TST official, Lilongwe, 13 April 2016.
15 LDF-TST has had four Executive Directors since its inception: Sam Kakhobwe, Edward Sawerengera, Ted Kalebe, and Charles Mandala.
16 Interview, Ministry of Local Government official, Lilongwe, 9 April 2016. In the same interview, the respondent narrated how another minister ap-
pointed by the People’s Party administration influenced the construction of a community secondary school and a market in her constituency. The
projects remained unfinished as the contractor and the Ministry of Local Government are currently fighting a court case related to corruption as part
of the Cashgate scandal.
17 Interview with member of the Village Development Committee chairperson, Thyolo, 7 March 2017.
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impact and attaining value for money for the resources
pumped into a particular country. The processes and pro-
cedures required to achieve positive impact and value for
money may be of less concern to the head office, hence
the temptation for the country staff of aid agencies to
act as clients (abiding by the wishes of local politicians)
as they focus on delivering what is expected of them
by the head office. The emerging consensus in the con-
text of the ‘messy politics’ of development aid (Yanguas,
2018) is that aid has small but positive effect on eco-
nomic growth (Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2011). The diverging
views on about aid effectiveness originate from difficul-
ties in measuring the effectiveness of aid (Bourguignon
& Sundberg, 2007).
4.4. Institutional Design and Competition for Scarce
Resources
The LDF is designed as a collective financing mechanism
for local development realized through the harmoniza-
tion of donor-funded projects under the stewardship of
the Malawian Government. All district councils should
thus ideally interact with the government rather than
with individual donors. In 2008, the government also
made a commitment to harmonize its institutional pro-
cedures relating to local development financing and es-
tablished a single institution—the National Local Govern-
ment Finance Committee—with the mandate to interact
with local councils and other players on matters of local
development (GOPA, 2005). However, in practice we find
that this mandate is sharedwith the LDF. And the current
institutional design allows local councils and others to in-
teract directly with the LDF-TST, contrary to the original
design. This is a major problem because while the Min-
istry of the Local Government and Rural Development
and the National Local Government Finance Committee
are bypassed in decision-making, these are in reality the
institutions with the official mandate to guide local coun-
cils. Thus, the donors use the LDF-TST to interact with
local councils and implement their projects rather than
engaging with the national government.
Since the LDF offers four financing windows, there
is now increased competition in the local development
sector to access multiple opportunities for funding. The
windows that are heavily competed for are those funded
by donors—the community, local authority, and urban
windows. Because of its perceived pressure to fund lo-
cal council activities as well as serve donor and govern-
ment interests, the LDF has extended its mandate to
become a grants provider. Thus, the LDF now plays a
double role—as a grants-issuing institution as well as a
PMU. For example, it awards projects to local councils
in the urban window. And for all such projects funded
by the KfW, allocation is based on an expression of in-
terest through a donor-influenced application process
which differs from the constitutionally approved inter-
governmental fiscal formula. Thus, in the KfW urban
window-funded projects, local councils submit their ap-
plications and compete among themselves for the grants.
The essence of awarding projects on a competitive ba-
sis is that councils have to prove that they have both
the technical and financial capacity to complete projects
within an agreed timeframe. While such competition
in awarding projects may promote innovative solutions
(e.g. construction of stadia and bus depots for local rev-
enue generation), implementation is often problematic
as councils tend to undercut practices among themselves
in a bid towin the projects (e.g. district versus town coun-
cils). By becoming a grants-issuing unit, the LDF is search-
ing for ways to survive the government-led restructuring
process and yet doing a disservice to the aid effective-
ness agenda.
The competition to attract the resources that come
with aid is also intense among elected representatives
at both central government and local council levels.
Such competition among councilors andMPs occurs view
of other local development financing mechanisms un-
der the control of the central government (e.g. the
Constituency Development Fund and the District Devel-
opment Fund). The increase of earmarked funds for a
specific group (such as the Constituency Development
Fund for MPs) leads to increased competition among dif-
ferent stakeholders. A local council official made a criti-
cal observation: ‘We implement many projects that are
outside the development plans hence sometimes not re-
ally responding to the immediate needs of our local com-
munities.’18 The implication is that councils often experi-
ence allocative inefficiency as resources are invested in
wrong sectors/areas.
Scholars have previously argued that MPs and
councils in Malawi routinely tussle over financial re-
sources to develop their local constituencies (Cammack,
Kanyongolo, Gooloba-Mutebi, & O’Neil, 2007; Chinsinga,
2005; Tambulasi, 2009). This competition for resources
has a negative impact on aid effectiveness as both admin-
istrators and elected officials aim to use the resources
for career development and for gaining political mileage,
which do not necessarily address the needs of local indi-
viduals and households.
5. Conclusion
While the international aid discourse routinely highlights
the importance of harmonized policies and aid disburse-
ments aligned to the needs and goals of recipient govern-
ments, there are numerous disagreements on how this
can best be implemented on the ground. The aim of our
study was to examine how and to what extent multilat-
eral and bilateral development agencies bypass national
and local government institutions while channeling aid,
and the impact of such practices on aid effectiveness in
Africa. A focus onMalawi, which is heavily dependent on
bilateral and multilateral aid, is particularly illustrative of
the challenges many countries face in achieving devel-
18 Key informant interview, Thyolo District Council, Thyolo, 18 March 2017.
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opment outcomes when their policy space is limited by
the dominant role and influence of external actors in na-
tional policymaking and implementation.
Donors often choose to bypass national institutions
while implementing development projects citing inade-
quate administrative capacity, unhealthy political inter-
ference, and widespread corruption. In turn, political
leaders in aid-dependent countries often choose not to
challenge donor practices and reforms that are aimed at
bypassing national institutions in order to improve aid
effectiveness. Rather, they may choose to focus their en-
ergy on devising ways to redirect such resources to them-
selves and their preferred constituents.
The LDFwas established to address the growing prob-
lem of uncoordinated aid targeting local development.
In order to check the uncontrolled proliferation of aid
agencies and projects, a basket fund was created that
would pool resources and strengthen the ability of the
government to better devise and implement develop-
ment and governance projects at the local level in line
with its national policy priorities. In practice, however,
the LDF has ended up largely bypassing administrative
structures, which in turn has created frustration among
officials and slowed down the aid effectiveness agenda in
Malawi. Earmarked funding, specialized procurement ar-
rangements, and the establishment of specialized PMUs
are among the mechanisms used by donors to circum-
vent the involvement of national institutions. Thus, we
find that aid sometimes weakens the very institutions it
aims to build and strengthen (Booth, 2011).
The growing use of bypass mechanisms to circum-
vent the public administration in aid-receiving countries
is often justified on the grounds of weak public finan-
cial management system, low local capacity to absorb
aid, low capacity to formulate and implement programs,
high risk of using aid for unintended purposes (patron-
age and clientelism), and mixed priorities on the part
of both donors and aid recipients. But donors also have
their own reasons that compel them to create bypasses—
visibility/publicity of their efforts, documenting attribu-
tion and impact of their projects, and pursuing specific
goals such as policy influence. However, rather than pro-
moting the principles of greater local ownership, capac-
ity building, and harmonization of available external re-
sources, we find that bypass mechanisms are fragment-
ing aid delivery and negatively affecting its effectiveness.
Our findings support the call by Eichenauer and
Reinsberg (2017) for a re-examination of the hypothesis
that bypasses are always the fastest way of delivering aid
to local communities. Indeed, not all bypasseswill be suc-
cessful in delivering quick and efficient aid to local com-
munities. Rather, the effectiveness of bypass strategies
will depend on the type of institutional design adopted
and the existing rules of the game that incentivize actors
to make quick decisions and implement such policies ef-
fectively in linewith original intentions. The reality on the
ground is that recipient country governments continue
to prefer budget support, as this gives themmore control
of resources and allows them to make decisions regard-
ing expenditure and allocation. In contrast, many donors
are showing a growing preference for project and pro-
gram aid, which they can more easily control. The aid ar-
chitecture in Sub-Saharan Africa has, in recent decades,
witnessed a pendulum swing from project/program aid
to budget support and then back to project aid.
The Malawian case demonstrates that aid effective-
ness is compromised by the reluctance of both donors
and recipients to more aggressively confront problems
that arise from the practice of patronage politics.We con-
clude thatwhile bypass practicesmay achieve short-term
gains by displaying successful and visible ‘donorship,’ the
long-term impact is more uncertain. The overall conclu-
sion is that the bypassing of local institutions results in
fragmentation of aid, lack of coordination among aid in-
dustry actors, and a general weakening of policy space
and domestic capacity to formulate and implement de-
velopment policy.
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge financial and adminis-
trative support given by NORAD through the NORHED
Programme for the project, ‘Strengthening capacity
for democratic and economic governance in Malawi.’
The project is jointly implemented by the Centre for
Development and the Environment at the University of
Oslo and the Department of Political and Administrative
Studies at the University of Malawi. The views expressed
in this article do not necessarily represent the views of
the funders.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Abdel-Malek, T. (2015). The global partnership for ef-
fective development cooperation: Origins, actions
and future prospects. Bonn: German Development
Institute.
African Development Bank. (2008). Project appraisal re-
port. Abidjan: African Development Bank.
Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives aid to whom
and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 33–63.
Amundsen, I. (2017). Malawi: Country evaluation
brief. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation.
Arndt, C., Jones, S. & Tarp, F. (2011). Aid effectiveness:
Opening the black box (WIDER Working Paper No.
2011/044). Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Ayittey, G. B. N. (Ed.). (2005). Africa unchained: The
blueprint for Africa’s future. New York, NY: Palgrave.
Ball, N., & Beijnum, M. (2010). Pooled funding for tran-
sition at the country level. Geneva: United National
Development Program.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 103–116 113
Bandstein, S. (2007). What determines the choice of
aid modalities? A framework for assessing incentive
structures. Karlstad: Swedish Agency for Develop-
ment Evaluation.
Banik, D. (2013). China and poverty reduction in Africa. In
G. Yu (Ed.), Rethinking law and development: The Chi-
nese experience (pp. 215–246). London: Routledge.
Banik, D. (2018). TheMalawi paradox. The Oslo SDG Blog.
Retrieved from https://www.sum.uio.no/english/
sdg/blog/dan-banik/the-malawi-paradox.html
Banik, D., & Chasukwa, M. (2016). The impact of emerg-
ing donors on development and poverty reduction. In
D. Banik & B. Chinsinga (Eds.), The democratic divi-
dend: Political transition and inclusive development
in Malawi (pp. 147–168). London: Routledge.
Barder, O. M. (2009). Beyond planning: Markets and
networks for better aid (Working Paper, No. 185).
Washington, DC, and London: Center for Global
Development.
Bermeo, S. (2018). Targeted development: Industrialised
country strategy in a globalizing world. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Booth, D. (2011). Working with the grain and swim-
ming against the tide: Barriers to uptake of research
findings on governance and public services in low-
income Africa (African Power Politics Program, Work-
ing Paper, No. 18). London: Overseas Development
Institute.
Bourguignon, F., & Sundberg, M. (2007). Aid effective-
ness: The opening of the black box. TheAmerican Eco-
nomic Review, 97(2), 316–321.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., &
Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of political survival.
Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Burnell, P. (1997). Foreign aid in a changing world. Buck-
ingham: Open University Press.
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (1997). Aid, policies, and
growth (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 569252). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies and growth.
American Economic Review, 90(4), 847–868.
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2004). Aid, policies and growth:
Revisiting evidence (Policy Research Working Paper
No. 3251). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Calderisi, R. (2006). The trouble with Africa: Why foreign
aid is not working. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Cammack, D., Kanyongolo, F., Gooloba-Mutebi, F., &
O’Neil, T. (2007). Neopatrimonial politics, decentral-
ization and local government: Uganda andMalawi in
2006 (Overseas Development Institute, Working Pa-
per, No. 2). London: Overseas Development Institute.
Chinsinga, B. (2005). District assemblies in a fix: The per-
ils of the politics of capacity in the political and ad-
ministrative reforms in Malawi. Development South-
ern Africa, 22(4), 529–548.
Clemens, M., Radelet, S., & Bhavnani, R. (2004). The
short-termeffect of aid on growth (Working PaperNo.
44). Washington, DC, and London: Centre for Global
Development.
Collier, P., & Dollar, D. (2002). Aid allocation and
poverty reduction. European Economic Review, 46(8),
1475–1500.
Crawford, G. (2003). Democratization in Ghana: Assess-
ing the impact of political aid (1997–2003). Paper pre-
sented at ECPR Conference, Marburg, Germany.
Dalgaard, C. J., Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2004). On the em-
pirics of foreign aid and growth. Economic Journal,
114(496), F191–F216.
Dasandi, N.,Marquette, H., & Robinson,M. (2016). Think-
ing and working politically: From theory building to
building an evidence base (Development Leadership
Programme, Research Paper No. 37). Birmingham:
University of Birmingham.
Dietrich, S. (2013) Bypass or engage? Explaining donor
delivery tactics in foreign aid allocation. International
Studies Quarterly, 57(4), 698–712.
Dietrich, S., & Winters, M. (2016). Foreign aid and gov-
ernment legitimacy. Journal of Experimental Political
Science, 2(2), 164–171.
Dollar, D., & Levin, V. (2004). The increasing selectivity
of foreign aid, 1984–2002 (Working Paper No. 3299).
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Hodler, R., Parks, B. C., Raschky, P.
A., & Tierney, M. J. (2014). Aid on demand: African
leaders and the geography of China’s foreign assis-
tance (AidData Working Paper No. 3). Virginia: Aid-
Data.
Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth? Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 23–48.
Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden: Why the
West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill
and so little good. New York, NY: Penguin.
Eichenauer, V. Z., & Reinsberg, B. (2017). What deter-
mines earmarked funding to international develop-
ment organizations? Evidence from the new multi-bi
aid data. The Review of International Organizations,
12(2), 171–197.
Foster, M., & Fozzard, A. (2000). Aid and public expendi-
ture (Working Paper No. 141). London: Overseas De-
velopment Institute.
GOPA. (2005). Functional review of Local Development
Fund/MASAF. Lilongwe, Malawi: KfW.
Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2001). Aid and growth regressions.
Journal of Development Economics, 64(2), 547–570.
Harrison, G., Mulley, S., & Holtom, D. (2009). Tanzania:
A genuine case of recipient leadership in the aid sys-
tem? In L. Whitfield (Ed.), The politics of aid: African
strategies for dealing with donors (pp. 271–298). Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Hyden, G. (2008). After the Paris declaration: Taking
on the issue of power. Development Policy Review,
26(3), 259–274.
Knack, S. (2004). Aid dependence and the quality of gov-
ernance: Cross-country empirical tests. Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, 64(2), 310–329.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 103–116 114
LDF-TST. (2015a). The local development fund: Establish-
ment, successes and challenges—An outlook on the
local development funding mechanism 2009 to 2014.
Lilongwe: Local Development Fund.
LDF-TST. (2015b). Expression of interest: Provision of
procurement audit for local economic development
project. Lilongwe: Local Development Fund.
LDF-TST. (2018). Technical audit for social cash trans-




Leiderer, S. (2013). Donor coordination for effective gov-
ernment policies? Aid, Social Policy and Develop-
ment, 27(8), 1422–1445.
Li, X. (2017). Should China join the GPEDC? The prospects
for China and the global partnership for effective
development co-operation (Discussion Paper, No.
17/2017). Bonn: German Development Institute.
Malawi Government. (2015a). Malawi aid atlas. Li-
longwe, Malawi: Ministry of Finance.
Malawi Government. (2015b). Malawi development co-
operation atlas: 2012/13, 2013/14, 2014/15. Li-
longwe: Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and
Development.
Malawi Government. (2017). 2016 public debt manage-
ment report. Lilongwe:Ministry of Finance, Economic
Planning and Development.
Meinhardt, H., & Patel, N. (2003). Malawi’s process of
democratic transition: An analysis of political devel-
opments between 1990 and 2003. Lilongwe: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation.
Morrissey, O. (2006). Aid or trade, or aid and trade? The
Australian Economic Review, 39(1), 78–88.
Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and
how there is a better way for Africa. New York, NY:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Ndulo, M. (2014). Introduction. In M., Ndulo & N., Walle
(Eds.), Problems, promises and paradoxes of aid (pp.
1–15). Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
Nilsson, K., & Nkhoma, B. B. (2014). Short-term learn-
ing for long-term impact: Lessons on project design
from Malawi. In R. J. Shaw, N. V. Anh, & T. H. Dang
(Eds.), Sustainable water and sanitation services for
all in a fast-changing world: Proceedings of the 37th
WEDC International Conference. Hanoi: Construction
Publishing House.
Nunnenkamp, P., Ohler, H., & Andres, M. S. (2017). Need,
merit and politics in multilateral aid allocation: A dis-
trict-level analysis ofWorld Bank projects in India. Re-
view of Development Economics, 21(1), 126–156.
OECD. (2005). Paris declaration for development aid ef-
fectiveness. Paris: OECD.
OECD. (2008). Accra agenda for action. Paris: OECD.
OECD. (2011). Busan partnership for effective develop-
ment co-operation. Paris: OECD.
OECD. (2012).Harmonisation of donor practices, in aid ef-
fectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris
Declaration. Paris: OECD.
Oh., J., & , Kim, Y. (2015). Proliferation and fragmenta-
tion: Uphill struggle of aid effectiveness. Journal of
Development Effectiveness, 7(2), 92–207.
Ohler, H., & Nunnenkamp, P. (2014). Needs-based target-
ing or favoritism? The regional allocation of multilat-
eral aid within recipient countries. International Re-
view for Social Sciences, 67(3), 420–446.
Oya, C. (2006). The political economy of development aid
as main source of foreign finance for poor African
countries: Loss of policy space and possible alterna-
tives from East Asia. Paper presented at International
Forum on Comparative Political Economy of Globali-
sation, Renmin University of China, Beijing.
Quibria, M. G. (2014). Aid effectiveness: Research, pol-
icy and unresolved issues. Development Studies Re-
search: An Open Access Journal, 1(1), 75–87.
Reltien, R. (2001). The geopolitics of hunger, 2000–2001:
Hunger and power/action against hunger. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Renzio, P., & Hanlon, J. (2009). Mozambique: Contested
sovereignty? The dilemmas of aid dependence. In L.
Whitfield (Ed.), The politics of aid: African strategies
for dealing with donors (pp. 246–270). Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Resnick, D. (2012). Two steps forward, one step back: The
limits of foreign aid on Malawi’s democratic consoli-
dation. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Rogerson, A. (2005). Aid harmonization and alignment:
Bridging the gaps between reality and the Paris
reform agenda. Development Policy Review, 23(5),
531–552.
Sachs, J. (2006). How to help the poor: Piecemeal
progress or strategic plans? The Lancet, 367,
1309–1310.
Said, J., McGrath, J., Grant, C., & Chapman, G. (2011).
Evaluating aid-for-trade on the ground: Lessons from
Malawi (Issue Paper, No. 21). Geneva: ICTSD.
Tambulasi, R. (2009). All that glistens is not gold: The
impact of decentralization on corruption in the local
governance system in Malawi. Development South-
ern Africa, 26(2), 324–340.
van der Meer, E., Tostensen, A., Slob, A., & Jerve, A.
M. (2008). Managing aid exit and transformation
Malawi: Country case study. Stockholm: Swedish In-
ternational Development Agency.
Von Hagen, M., & Schulz, N. (2009). Silently leaving
Malawi: Sweden´s delegated exit. Madrid: FRIDE.
Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999). A proposal for a comprehensive
development framework (Discussion draft). Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank.
Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China,
emerging donors and the silent revolution in de-
velopment assistance. International Affairs, 84(6),
1205–1221.
Wroe, D. (2012). Donors, dependency and political crisis
in Malawi. African Affairs, 111(442), 135–144.
Yanguas, P. (2014). Leader, protester, enabler, spoiler:
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 103–116 115
Aid strategies and donor politics in institutional assis-
tance. Development Policy Review, 32(3), 299–312.
Yanguas, P. (2018). Why we lie about aid: Development
and the mess politics of change. London: Zed Books.
About the Authors
Michael Chasukwa is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Political and Administrative
Studies at the University of Malawi. He has a doctorate in development studies from the University of
Leeds. Dr. Chasukwa specializes in development cooperation, political economy, institutions, public
policy, decentralization and local government. He has carried out various assignments on governance
and development commissioned by the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, Tilitonse
Foundation, Oxfam, ActionAid, IrishAid, and DanChurch Aid, among others. His work is published in
peer reviewed journals including International Journal of Public Administration, Africa Review, Journal
of Development Effectiveness, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Insight on Africa and Malawi
Law Journal.
Dan Banik is Professor of political science and Research Director at the Centre for Development and
the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway. His research interests include poverty, food security,
famine, legal empowerment, aid and the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. Prof. Banik di-
rects the Oslo SDG Initiative (sum.uio.no/sdg) and writes a weekly column for The Nation (Malawi).
He has previously served as the Head of the Norwegian-Finnish Trust Fund in the World Bank for
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development and on the Board of the Norwegian Crown
Prince and Crown Princess’s Foundation. His books include Political Transition, Poverty and Inclusive
Development in Malawi: The Democratic Dividend (with Blessings Chinsinga, Routledge, 2016), The
Legal Empowerment Agenda: Poverty, Labour and the Informal Economy in Africa (2011, Ashgate),
Poverty and Elusive Development (2010, Scandinavian University Press) and Starvation and India’s
Democracy (2009, Routledge). Twitter: @danbanik
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 103–116 116
